Decoding Jonas Eidevall’s Arsenal

A change of coaching staff generally leads to a honeymoon period for the new manager, and none have enjoyed a sweeter spell than Arsenal’s Jonas Eidevall. Having guided the Gunners into first place in the WSL, Eidevall now faces the challenge of keeping the train chugging along. Their biggest challenge is the one Eidevall had to overcome at the very beginning — Emma Hayes’ Chelsea, who lead the league in goals scored, expected goals for and expected goals against.

While Arsenal have been bolstered by the arrivals of Frida Maanum, Nikita Parris, Mana Iwabuchi and Tobin Heath, it is by and large the old stalwarts who are leading the charge.

Beth Mead looks reborn under Eidevall, while Katie McCabe has been a fixture since day one. Vivianne Miedema needs little incentive to keep scoring, while Leah Williamson continues to anchor the defensive side. Unfortunately, an injury means that the England international is out for a while, but Eidevall not only has solid replacements in Lotte Wubben-Moy and Jennifer Beattie but also legitimate midfield destroyers in Frida Maanum and Lia Wälti.

There is little doubt that this is a side capable of challenging for the title; with Manchester City largely out of the running, the Gunners have just one obstacle to overcome.

The question now arises: how, exactly, has Jonas Eidevall accomplished this? What does the new man’s vision…

In terms of my philosophy and beliefs, I view football as something that is everything together, all the time. What I mean by that is that I don’t think you can view attack in a separate way to defense. Everything sits together. The way you attack will impact the way you defend because you will inherit the positions from when you lose the ball, and vice versa when you’re defending. You need to have a clear idea which allows you to use all the parts of football together.

…actually mean? What are Arsenal good at? Conversely, what are the areas where they are at a disadvantage? These are the issues I will explore in this piece, following from my previous work on Bayern Munich Women’s Bundesliga-winning 2020–21 campaign.

Defense

For all of the praise that has been lavished on their attack, Eidevall’s Arsenal is built on defense and a robust pressing system that has been assimilated with lightning speed by the players. This shows in how they have executed it in high-profile games, as well as the slight variations that Eidevall has opted to suit the opposition. Games against Chelsea and Manchester City show how strong Arsenal are in this phase, as will become clearer through the following examples.

Against Chelsea, Arsenal used a 4–3–3 and 4–2–3–1 shape interchangeably. They lined up in a 4–3–3 structure on goal kicks, as seen here:

However, this was not a standard 4–3–3 structure, as attacking midfielder Kim Little dropped between the Maanum/Wälti double pivot. This helped Arsenal seal off the center as a means of progression. Moreover, the fullbacks squeezed up in some scenes, since they could cover wider areas more easily and thereby protect the double pivot. In turn, this helped the central midfielders (Maanum and Wälti) check for a dropping Chelsea forward, through whom the Blues could potentially break the press.

The result was a structure from which Arsenal could force Chelsea to go long, since nearby options were closed off and dropping movements were covered by the central midfielders. This scene shows just how high the Arsenal fullbacks were allowed to go, demonstrating Eidevall’s courage against a quality opponent:

In the above scene, we see how the front three (particularly Iwabuchi) have forced Chelsea to go long, since nearby options were marked.

Arsenal’s advantages continued even when the fullbacks eased back into the defensive line, since the Gunners adjusted personnel based on the number of Chelsea players involved in the buildup. Where Arsenal adopted a more patient approach (as opposed to immediately sprinting to the Chelsea center-back), the advantages of the shape remained clear:

The pressing system worked well in the first half, which is when Arsenal built up a lead and could have had one more had Iwabuchi not fluffed her chance. The system relied on players knowing their assignments, rotating and recovering on time, which is easy when the midfield has players like Little, Maanum and Wälti who have tremendous feel for the game.

Where Arsenal’s press was broken and the Gunners had to retreat, they did not panic, displaying a narrow 4–2–3–1 shape that again focused on closing off the center and helped Arsenal guard the flanks:

This defensive consistency helped Arsenal hold on to their lead towards the end of the game, as Chelsea piled on the pressure after bringing on Sam Kerr and Frank Kirby. The defensive effort was spectacular as Eidevall took a famous victory to start his WSL reign, which is the key result that keeps Arsenal in pole position for the title.

Things changed against Manchester City, against whom Arsenal recorded their lowest possession figure at 38%. Despite this, they ran out 5–0 winners, and while the scoreline was fattened by their chance conversion, it does underline their defensive dominance.

With McCabe, Miedema and Mead as the forwards, Arsenal used a 4–4–2 shape with Little partnering Miedema up top:

As the text suggests, the exact shape varied from 4–4–2 to 4–2–4 and 4–2–3–1, but what was consistently evident was Little in advanced positions with the Maanum and Wälti double pivot just behind. Moreover, this was a clear high pressing system, since the defensive line moved up behind the midfield and jumped if a City player received between the lines.

Mostly, the front two diverted City to a side, following which they squeezed the Citizens into a trap on the flank:

This screengrab shows it well — Mead is facing the ball carrier, whose nearby options are all blocked. Maanum and McCabe are lurking outside the scene in case of a switch, and Arsenal force a turnover in this situation.

This shows another situation, where McCabe recognizes the numbers advantage and given her starting position, curves her run to prompt a pass inside:

Maanum (#12) is already moving towards the intended recipient, and Arsenal once again force a turnover here.

With Arsenal moving compactly across the pitch, the trigger for the press seemed to be situations where the forwards felt they had enough numbers to put the receiver in trouble. If they guided play to the flanks, it was clear that Arsenal would have the resources to collapse the space, which was a key switch. Another trigger — specific to the midfielders — was when the forwards had been beaten and the receiver was taking the ball on the turn, which prompted them to jump and exploit a turnover to attack the numbers advantage.

Their quality means that they were rarely beaten, but even if they were, solid box defending — as seen against Chelsea and City in the later stages — helped the press retain its effectiveness. It is easier for a team to employ this approach if they know that their effort will be supplemented by backline defending, and Arsenal have certainly had this security throughout the season.

One reason is the proactiveness of the defense, as seen here against Manchester United:

The receiver drops and United manage to find her with a pass, but the height of the defensive chain means that Wubben-Moy is in a position to step out and intervene. Here, she forces a turnover and immediately resets Arenal’s defensive transition.

This is also a role performed by Leah Williamson, whose front foot stance makes the more physical and aggressive defender. Her awareness of when the defensive chain has to be moved up to complement the press is superb; however, what truly sets her apart is her quality on the ball (which will be discussed later).

Even when the press fails and opponents progress through the center, Arsenal’s center-backs (and recovery by the midfielders) makes them a tough proposition to break down.

For example, in this scene Spurs have broken into the Arsenal half following an extremely negative first half:

But they are unable to capitalize as Beattie forces a suboptimal touch for the Spurs forward which leads her right into the backtracking left back (Steph Catley). A better play would have been a pass that turns Williamson around and exploits her lack of support, but Arsenal do not allow that to happen and turn Spurs’ anxiety for a breakthrough against them.

As mentioned before, Arsenal also display variability in their scheme, as seen from their games against Everton and Spurs.

Against Everton, they used a 4–4–2 shape, with a clear intent move the Toffees to their left and open up spaces on the right, as outlined by Eidevall:

And against Spurs, we saw the 4–3–3 shape, with Little and Maanum playing as the attacking midfielders with Wälti at the base:

This kind of variation is possible because Arsenal know what they want to do regardless of formation.

The idea is to control the game through the press by luring the opposition into traps and attacking off turnovers. The usual plan is to guide play to the touchline, where the results are usually bad for the opposition (as seen above). On the other hand, they are also comfortable funneling play inside, since they aim to block off the center and can win the ball back with their overloads and superior quality.

So far, this section has highlighted the pressing system and the strong box defending that so effectively supports it; but it is also important to mention how Arsenal counterpress to win back the ball.

This example is from the game against United, where Arsenal’s pressing was extraordinarily effective:

Here, Arsenal regroup the second they lose the ball, immediately picking up the closest player and marking them out of the game.

Mead is rushing to close down the passing window and Arsenal are ready to move up and consolidate possession, which is why United are again forced into a defensive phase. It can be dispiriting for opponents when an attacking transition is short-circuited, particularly against an opponent for superior quality like Arsenal.

Ultimately, it is the confluence of these factors that has seen Arsenal concede just three goals from an xGA of 6.6. It is true that opponent errors have helped them (particularly from Spurs), but even a 6.6 xGA deserves to be celebrated when Arsenal were conceding nearly twice as much last season.

It shows how Arsenal has been a side that hangs its hat on its defensive prowess, with the development in the pressing game being of particular interest. As covered by the excellent Tim Stillman, Eidevall’s thoughts on pressing extend even to substitutions, which are carefully timed to stave off fatigue and ensure that the press remains structured. This is necessary due to the forwards playing key roles in the press, and demonstrates the kind of attention to defensive detail that has seen the Gunners reach the top of the WSL.

Offense

This season, Arsenal have had a wonderfully potent attack. So far, they have scored 26 goals in the WSL, which comes to around 3.25 per game from a non-penalty xG of 14.1. However, these numbers pale in comparison to Chelsea’s numbers, who have netted 27 from a non-penalty xG of 23.1. That Arsenal have such a discrepancy between the underlying and actual numbers leads me to the key point — there is a possibility that the Gunners are not perhaps as offensively proficient as they appear on the surface.

Before delving into that aspect, it is worthwhile to look at exactly how Eidevall has changed Arsenal. Apart from becoming more direct, the Londoners have tended to be sharply oriented towards the left given the surfeit of talent on the wings.

This is evident from the buildup stage, where Arsenal usually form a diamond with Wälti at the top and goalkeeper Manuela Zinsberger at the bottom:

While the screengrab above is clear, the following graphic illustrates the range of options available to the different players involved in this initial stage:

As is clear, it is the center-backs who do the lion’s share of work in the buildup, with the fullbacks holding positions. Usually, the left back has the higher position, which becomes even more extreme when McCabe occupies the position. However, McCabe at left back has been an infrequent sight, since Eidevall has her operating as a left winger.

However, this change of position was not evident from the start, since McCabe started at left back against Chelsea. The imperative to get her going was evident, as seen here:

This was a frequent occurrence versus Chelsea, where a midfielder tucked into a defensive position which freed McCabe to advance.

Another instance is seen here, where Iwabuchi — the nominal left winger — has abandoned her position on the wing and roamed inside:

The amount of space available to McCabe signals her key status in the offense, and she has contributed 4 goals and 5 assists in 7 starts this season.

The above screengrab is interesting because apart from weaponising McCabe, it shows another key pillar of Arsenal’s offense — specifically, in terms of Williamson’s position as she plays this switch.

Under Eidevall, Arsenal routinely park themselves in the opponent’s half, which means that they are frequently faced with deep blocks. Against this organization, recirculation of possession is a priority, which is where the center-backs comes in.

When they receive the ball, as Williamson does here, she has a number of options:

Given her position, she can find a number of passing options, or drive with the ball given how no one is blocking her path. Both would result in Arsenal pinning Spurs deep and could open up gaps elsewhere.

This is another instance of the same, as Wubben-Moy is free to play the ball into unmarked right back Noëlle Maritz:

But perhaps the most notable instance of the freedom given to center-backs comes from this screengrab:

As the text indicates, there are downstream effects from the role enjoyed by the center-backs. This is because Arsenal seek to build down the flanks, almost by necessity given how teams close off central areas. It seems to be a wise choice with Miedema and Little lurking in the middle, but in any case, Arsenal are content to build through the flanks.

The screengrab above shows the box structure that Arsenal use to get into the final third, with the added option open to Williamson whereby she can switch to the other side.

Arsenal games are littered with instances like these, as seen from this game against West Ham:

Here, it is immediately evident how these box structures help Arsenal progress: with support available to the ball carrier (and the opposition placed in a bind due to rotations and counter movements), not only does the recipient have options, but it also helps the Gunners counterpress when they lose possession.

Here is yet another example that demonstrates this kind of box structure on the wing:

This screengrab is important because it shows how Arsenal create the space that their center-backs an fullbacks enjoy. This is because when such box structures are created, the forwards take up positions between the lines that bind the defensive line.

This is a relevant example:

In this scenario, the midfield cannot jump out on Wälti since she can resolve the press with a simple pass to the forwards. This principle also applies to the center-backs (particularly Williamson), all of whom are adept at finding the forwards between the lines. This puts defenders in a crisis since Arsenal have proximity between their forwards for the kind of one-touch play that can generate a shot or box entry.

This picture provides another example, where Mead and Iwabuchi combine for a shot after the former receives the pass under pressure:

Despite eight players in place to stop a progression sequence, there are large enough gaps between the defenders that a quick forward could exploit if the right pass is played.

This would be even more potent if they were accompanied by counter movements and coordinated sleight of hand, but the Gunners do not yet seem to be at that stage. This is a good example where Arsenal should have created a situation from which they generate a shot:

This is not to say that players do not recognise when such situations occur — for example, in this situation Miedema expertly uses her gravity to create space for Little (who is making a counter movement in the opposite direction):

The reason I emphasize this is because of how it bolsters the things that Arsenla already do well. For example, the Gunners are adept at overloading opponents on the left wing using double width, as seen in this example:

This is a situation that Arsenal often find themselves in, where Catley and McCabe are on the outside and can pick between different options.

Unfortunately, this is where my issue with the offense arises — often, it feels like the Gunners settle for a cross from deep, when it would be better to accompany these double width situations with movement on the far side. As a winger, McCabe is physical and direct, but it feels like those attributes are better demonstrated when she is motoring up the wing with a head of steam.

Against Everton, she had Tobin Heath on her side, but the winger frequently roamed inside and created ideal situations for McCabe:

This is a superb situation given McCabe’s crossing ability; had Mead been in the box, it is likely that this would have resulted in a goal via a header at the far post.

This brings me to the point I made to start this section — the goals scored figure might flatter Arsenal, and it is possible that they are leaving some meat on the bone. The direct approach — form buildup as well as counterpressing sequences that lead to transitions — has been wonderfully effective, but against the best sides, Arsenal should look for more variety and unpredictability.

The familiarity of Arsenal’s moves with McCabe on the wing might be a sign for Eidevall to bring a creative player on the wing, rather than rely on the Irish international up front. Iwabuchi, Nobbs or Heath would be excellent on the wing, as their inclusion would add a wrinkle to Arsenal’s straightforward offensive scheme.

Should it fail, Eidevall can always move around the chess pieces — bring McCabe up front, and Catley at left back. Already, the coach is flexible with formations, the next step would be to play a bit more with personnel to assess the combinations that work. Ultimately, Arsenal are still a wonderful team going forward, but as Barcelona have shown, there is a lot of value to be gained from sprinkling in some inventiveness and deception. That might be precisely what they require to assert themselves against the continental elite — Chelsea, Barcelona, PSG and Olympique Lyon.

Conclusion

As with my portrait on Bayern Women, this has been an attempt to explain the workings of Jonas Eidevall’s Arsenal. This is clearly a strong team that has made big strides in shedding their reputation in big games, but in my opinion, they need more tactical flexibility if they are to go far in Europe. This assessment might be wrong and the direct approach may be enough to shock an opponent, but as Barcelona have shown, this might not be sufficient against the cream of the crop. Arsenal are not yet at the Catalans’ level — whether they get there depends on Eidevall coming up with more tweaks and variations on the primary game plan.